Abstract. This paper describes an algorithm for computing elliptic scalar multiplications on non-supersingular elliptic curves de ned over GF(2 m ). The algorithm is an optimized version of a method described in 1], which is based on Montgomery's method 8]. Our algorithm is easy to implement in both hardware and software, works for any elliptic curve over GF(2 m ), requires no precomputed multiples of a point, and is faster on average than the addition-subtraction method described in draft standard IEEE P1363. In addition, the method requires less memory than projective schemes and the amount of computation needed for a scalar multiplication is xed for all multipliers of the same binary length. Therefore, the improved method possesses many desirable features for implementing elliptic curves in restricted environments.
Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography rst suggested by Koblitz 5] and Miller 12] is becoming increasingly common for implementing public-key protocols as the Di eHellman key agreement. The security of these cryptosystems relies on the presumed intractability of the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves. Since there is no known sub-exponential type algorithm for elliptic curves over nite elds, the sizes of the elds, keys, and other parameters can be considered shorter than other public key cryptosystems such as RSA with the same level of security. This can be especially an advantage for applications where resources such as memory and/or computing power are limited.
Elliptic curves over GF (2 m ) are particularly attractive, because the nite eld operations can be implemented very e ciently in hardware and software.
See for example 1] for a hardware implementation of GF (2 155 ), and 15, 18] for a software implementation of GF (2 155 ) and GF (2 191 ).
Given an elliptic point P and a large integer k of about the size of the underlying eld, the operation elliptic scalar multiplication, kP, is de ned to be the elliptic point resulting from adding P to itself k times. This operation, analogous to exponentiation in multiplicative groups, is the most time consuming operation of the elliptic curve cryptosystems.
In this paper, the calculation of kP for a random integer k and a random point P is considered. An e cient scalar multiplication algorithm, which is an optimized version of an algorithm described in 1], is presented. The proposed algorithm is suitable for hardware and software implementation of random elliptic curves over GF(2 m ).
Previous work
The basic method for computing kP is the addition-subtraction method described in draft standard IEEE P1363 14] . This method is an improved version over the well known \add-and-double" (or binary) method, which requires no precomputations. For a random multiplier k, this algorithm performs on average 8 3 log 2 k eld multiplications and 4 3 log 2 k eld inversions in a ne coordinates, and 8 1 3 log 2 k eld multiplications in projective coordinates. Several proposed generalizations of the binary method (for exponentiation in a multiplicative group), such as the k-ary method, the signed window method, can be extended to compute elliptic scalar multiplications over a nite eld 11]. These algorithms are based on the use of precomputation and methods for recoding the multiplier. In 3], several algorithms are analyzed under various conditions. However, most of the proposed optimizations may not be worthwhile when memory is at a premium.
Some special classes of elliptic curves de ned over GF(2 m ) allow e cient implementations. For anomalous curves, the fastest known algorithm to compute kP is given in 17]; for curves de ned over small sub elds, e cient algorithms are presented in 13].
In 4, 16, 7] some techniques are presented for accelerating methods such as k-ary and window based methods. These methods are suitable for software implementation of random elliptic curves over GF(2 m ).
A di erent approach for computing kP was introduced by Montgomery 8 ]. This approach is based on the binary method and the observation that the xcoordinate of the sum of two points whose di erence is known can be computed in terms of the x-coordinates of the involved points. This method uses the following variant of the binary method: Fig. 1 Note that this method maintains the invariant relationship P 2 ? P 1 = P, and performs an addition and a doubling in each iteration. In 9], Montgomery's method was applied for reducing the number of registers needed to add points in supersingular curves over GF(2 m ). However, the authors observed that the bene ts in storage provided by Montgomery's method is at a considerable expense of speed.
From the point of view of hardware implementation of elliptic curves over GF(2 m ), few papers have discussed e cient methods for computing kP. In 1], Montgomery's method was adapted for non-supersingular elliptic curves over GF(2 m ). However, the formulas given for implementing each iteration are not e cient in terms of eld multiplications.
In this paper we will present an e cient implementation of Montgomery's method for computing kP on non-supersingular elliptic curves over GF(2 m ):
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we present a short introduction to elliptic curves over GF(2 m ). The proposed algorithm is described and analyzed in Section 4. Some running times of the proposed algorithm based on LiDIA are presented in Section 5. An implementation of the proposed algorithm is given in the appendix.
Elliptic Curves over GF (2 m )
Here we present a brief introduction to elliptic curves; more information on elliptic curves over nite elds of characteristic two can be found in 10, 14] . Let GF(2 m ) be a nite eld of characteristic two. A non-supersingular elliptic curve E over GF (2 m 
Notice that the x-coordinate of 2P does not involve the y-coordinate of P. This observation will be used in the derivation of the improved method.
Improved Method
This section describes the improved method for computing kP. We rst develop an algorithm in a ne coordinates which requires two eld inversions in each iteration. Next a \projective" version is presented with more eld multiplications, but with only one eld inversion at the end of the computation.
A ne version
The extension of Montgomery's method 8] to elliptic curves over GF(2 m ) requires formulas for implementing Step 3 of Algorithm 1. In what follows we give e cient formulas that use only the x-coordinates of P 1 , P 2 and P for performing the arithmetic operations needed in Algorithm 1. At the end of the (k ? 1)th iteration of Algorithm 1, we obtain the x-coordinates of kP and (k + 1)P. We also provide a simple formula for recovering the y-coordinate of kP.
The following lemma gives another formula for computing the x-coordinate of the addition of two di erent points. Lemma 1. Let P 1 = (x 1 ; y 1 ); and P 2 = (x 2 ; y 2 ) be elliptic points. Then the x-coordinate of P 1 + P 2 , x 3 , can be computed as follows. 
Proof. Since P 1 and P 2 are elliptic points, it follows that y 2 1 +y 2 2 +x 1 y 1 +x 2 y 2 + x 3 1 + x 3 2 = 0. The result then follows easily from formula (1).
The following lemma shows how to compute the x-coordinate for the addition of two points whose di erence is known.
Lemma 2. Let P = (x; y); P 1 = (x 1 ; y 1 ); and P 2 = (x 2 ; y 2 ) be elliptic points.
Assume that P 2 = P 1 +P. Then the x-coordinate of P 1 +P 2 , x 3 , can be computed in terms of the x-coordinates of P; P 1 and P 2 as follows. ;
Proof. The case P = O follows directly from (2). Applying formula (3), we obtain that the x-coordinate of P 2 + P 1 can be rewritten as 
The result follows from adding (5) and (6). The next lemma allows one to compute the y-coordinate of Q when P and the x-coordinates of Q and Q + P are known.
Lemma 3. Let P = (x; y); P 1 = (x 1 ; y 1 ); and P 2 = (x 2 ; y 2 ) be elliptic points. Assume that P 2 = P 1 + P and x 6 = 0. Then the y-coordinate of P 1 can be expressed in terms of P, and the x-coordinates of P 1 and P 2 as follows. y 1 = (x 1 + x)f(x 1 + x)(x 2 + x) + x 2 + yg=x + y :
Proof. Since P 2 = P 1 + P, we obtain from (3) that y 1 satis es the following The following algorithm, based on Lemmas 2 and 3, implements Montgomery's method in a ne coordinates. else Set x 1 x 2 1 + b=x 2 1 ; x 2 x + t 2 + t: 5. Set r 1 x 1 + x; r 2 x 2 + x. 6 . Set y 1 r 1 (r 1 r 2 + x 2 + y)=x + y 7 . return(Q = (x 1 ; y 1 )).
Observe that Algorithm 2A, in each iteration of Step 4, performs two eld inversions, one general eld multiplication, one multiplication by the constant b, two squarings, and four additions; it follows that the total number of eld operations to compute kP is given in the following lemma: 
Projective Version
When eld inversion in GF(2 m ) is relatively expensive (e.g., inversion based on Fermat's theorem requires at least 7 multiplications in GF(2 m ) if m 128), then it may be of computational advantage to use fractional eld arithmetic to perform elliptic curve calculations. Let P; P 1 and P 2 be points on the curve E such that P 2 = P 1 + P. Let the x-coordinate of P i be represented by X i =Z i , for i 2 f1; 2g. From Lemma 2, when the x-coordinate of 2P i is converted to projective coordinates it becomes X 2i = X 4 i + b Z 4 i ; Z 2i = Z 2 i X 2 i : (8) Similarly, the x-coordinate of P 1 +P 2 in projective coordinates can be computed as the fraction X 3 =Z 3 , where Z 3 = (X 1 Z 2 + X 2 Z 1 ) 2 ; X 3 = x Z 3 + (X 1 Z 2 ) (X 2 Z 1 ): (9) The addition formula requires three general eld multiplications, one multiplication by x (i.e., the x-coordinate of P, which is xed during the computation of kP), one squaring and two additions; doubling requires one general eld multiplication, one multiplication by the constant b, ve squarings, and one addition. A method based on these formulas is described in the next algorithm. #INV: = 1 ; #MULT: = 6blog 2 kc + 10 ; #ADD: = 3blog 2 kc + 7 ; #SQR: = 5blog 2 kc + 3: Remark. Since the complexity of both versions of Algorithm 2 does not depend on the number of 1's (or 0's) in the binary representation of k, this may help to prevent timing attacks. On the other hand, the use of restricted multipliers (e.g., with small Hamming weight) does not speedup directly Algorithms 2A and 2P, and this is a disadvantage compared to methods such as the binary method. However, from a practical point of view, most protocols in cryptographic applications use random multipliers.
Complexity Comparison
In the sequel, we assume that adding and squaring in GF(2 m ) is relatively fast. Now we compare the complexities of the addition-subtraction method to the complexity of the proposed method. This is a fair comparison since both methods do not use precomputation. For a random multiplier k, the additionsubtraction method in projective coordinates, given in 14], performs 8.3log 2 k eld multiplications; it follows we expect Algorithm 2P to be about 28% faster on average. However, if we use the formulas given in 7] for implementing the group operation in projective schemes, Algorithm 2P is about 14% faster than the addition-subtraction method. In the following table we summarize the complexities of these methods. Now we derive the cost of the addition-subtraction method (using a ne coordinates) in terms of eld multiplications. This cost can be estimated from the costs of 1 3 log 2 k additions and log 2 k doublings. Thus, the total cost is 4r + 8 3 multiplications, where r is the cost-ratio of inversion to multiplication. This shows that for implementations of the nite eld GF(2 m ) where r > 2:5 (see for example 1, 19, 4] , Algorithm 2P gives a computational advantage over the addition-subtraction method.
Running Times
In this section we present some running times we obtained in our software implementation of the proposed algorithmfor the nite elds GF(2 m ) for m = 163; 191 and 239. To represent the nite elds we used LiDIA 6], a C++ based library. This nite eld implementation uses a polynomial basis representation and the irreducible modulus is chosen as sparse as possible. We used a Sun UltraSPARC 300MHz machine. For comparison, we list the timings for the basic arithmetic operations in GF(2 m ).
Notice that one eld inverse costs more than 9 eld multiplications; therefore, the use of LiDIA may illustrate the performance of the proposed algorithm in situations where a eld inverse is relatively expensive compared to eld multiplication. In Table 3 we present average running times for computing a scalar multiplication using several methods. These values were obtained using the following test: we select 10 random elliptic curves (a = 0) over GF(2 m ), then we multiply a random point P in each curve with 100 randomly chosen integers of size < 2 m . We implemented the binary method in projective coordinates (see 10]), the addition-subtraction method 14] and Algorithm 2P. From Table 3 we conclude that the proposed method on average is 27-29% faster than the addition-subtraction method and 51% faster than the binary method. These timings show that the theoretical improvement of Algorithm 2P, given in Table  1 , is observed in a actual implementation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an e cient method for computing elliptic scalar multiplications, which is an optimized version of an algorithm presented in 1]. The method performs exactly 6blog 2 kc + 10 eld multiplication for computing kP on elliptic curves selected at random, is easy to implement in both hardware and software, requires no precomputations, works for any implementation of GF(2 n ), is faster than the addition-subtraction method on average, and uses fewer registers than methods based on projective schemes. Therefore, the method appears useful for applications of elliptic curves in constraint environments such as mobile devices and smart cards.
